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**REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS A MEANS FOR  
ACHIEVING NATIONAL INTERESTS:  
THE CASE OF BOTSWANA**

by

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September, 1996

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NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE CASE OF BOTSWANA**

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
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
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


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## **ABSTRACT**

Botswana gained independence in 1966 and was immediately faced with an enormous task of development since the country was very poor and depended largely on external aid. Ironically much of this grants in aid was British.

Political turmoil in neighboring countries and Botswana's economic fragility did not make anything easy. National power was almost nonexistent, and Botswana tended more to the use of diplomacy, regional and even international fora in pursuit of her national interests.

To some extent, these endeavors were successful even though there were occasional socio-economic and political setbacks. With positive changes that have occurred in the regional and international climate, diplomacy, and inter-state joint efforts have proved to be the most viable and less costly avenues for countries to pursue.

To this end, joint regional efforts within SADC are the best way to go for players in the Southern African "region."



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This thesis is dedicated to Tshepo, Mpho and Karabo Matenge who will always be the wind under my wings.



## **I. INTRODUCTION**

I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.

Winston S. Churchill, 1939

Botswana, like any other sovereign polity, has strived to achieve certain goals and objectives for its citizens since independence. Like all other developing countries, this path has not been easy due to the country's peculiar historical background.

This paper explores the concept and practice of regional integration perhaps as the most viable means for Botswana to achieve those objectives it sets itself. To this end, the example of the European Union, so far deemed to be classic example of such an endeavor is heavily relied upon.

Historically speaking, there is no more opportune moment for regional integration in Southern Africa than now owing to positive political changes that have occurred to date in the region and the world at large.

It is against such a background that this thesis argues that the only way to go for Botswana, and indeed for other Southern African members, is to foster regional integration for the benefit of all.

This thesis examines regional integration as perhaps the best means through which Botswana could best achieve her national interests within the Southern African region.

A historical background is was pertinent to give the reader the basis upon which certain conclusions and/or deductions were made, hence Chapter II deals with this aspect.

The conceptual definition of certain terminology (national interest, integration) utilized in the thesis was necessary; in this way then, there is no doubt in the readers mind as to what the discussion is leading to as opposed to ambiguity fostered by varying interpretations of terminology. Chapters II and IV cover these aspects. A summary is provided in Chapter V.

Chapter VI endeavors to provide lessons that Southern Africa could learn from the European Union as a basis for integration. Chapter VII attempts to define the Southern African region in terms of its country membership, its players or potential players and thus propose regional integration as the most viable approach to achieving national interests. This same chapter also goes further to look at the already existing structures upon which regionalism could be fostered. In conclusion, the paper argues that regionalism remains the most viable option for Botswana as well as Southern Africa in general if national interests are to be achieved.

## **II. THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BOTSWANA, THE CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND ITS APPLICATION TO BOTSWANA**

Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana) was declared a protectorate in 1885 after unrelenting appeals from Batswana<sup>1</sup> to Britain for protection against perceived incorporation into the Union of South Africa<sup>2</sup> (see Figure 1).

Britain acceded to this request because she would have attained what Cecil Rhodes (a British mining magnate cum explorer) termed the "Suez canal of the North" where British interests lay. As a result, Bechuanaland could provide the British with much needed territorial buffer which could practically keep out other competing foreign powers, particularly the Germans from meddling with British interests in the north. In this way, British access to the interior of Africa could be facilitated through this "territorial canal" which was deemed to be economically nonviable resulting, therefore, in the neglect by the British.

The then British High Commissioner emphasized this motive: "we have no interests in the country north of Molopo except as a road to the interior; we might therefore confine ourselves for the present to preventing that part of the protectorate being occupied by either filibusters or foreign powers doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as

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<sup>1</sup> Batswana is a term used to denote the people of Botswana. This term is plural, reference to one person is Motswana.

<sup>2</sup> For further details regarding the events leading to proclamation of the Protectorate and the strategic importance of Botswana to British colonial interests, see Morton, et al., (1989, pp. 89-97) and, Tlou and Campbell (1984, pp. 142-153).

possible."<sup>3</sup> Consequently, "having reluctantly assumed responsibility for the High Commission Territories,<sup>4</sup> Britain proceeded to neglect them totally for fifty years. Such development as has taken place is, in all three, effectively a post second world war phenomenon." (Picard, 1987, p. 96)

According to Picard, the thrust of British imperial fiscal policy in Bechuanaland clearly reflected the aforementioned pattern of neglect and was even parsimonious by comparison with other High Commission Territories; budgets in Bechuanaland were kept to a bare minimum or below. This should come as no surprise since the colonial administration's pre-occupation in Bechuanaland was basically two fold; 1) that the imperial government limit its activities in the territory to the maintenance of law and order, and 2) that the territory's population absorb the costs of the colonial administration as quickly as possible. Subsequently, "these concerns were resolved with an efficiency unrivaled even in the generally tightfisted economic policy that Britain followed throughout its colonial empire." (Picard, 1987, p. 97)

Pursuant to upholding law and order in the colony, it therefore comes as no surprise that the colonial administration in 1885 soon after occupation, found the Bechuanaland Border Police (BBP) for this purpose. For the BBP to be effective as it should have been,

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<sup>3</sup> Louis A. Picard. The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model of Success? Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Colorado; 1987, p. 36.

<sup>4</sup>The three High Commission Territories in Southern Africa which came under British protection during the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, as a result of the struggle between the boers and the British for dominance were; Bechuanaland in 1885 (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland in 1906. In each of these territories, the High Commissioner residing in Cape Town, acting through a Resident Commissioner was proclaimed the sole legislative authority.





Figure 1. Map of Southern Africa.

it is perfectly logical that it had to be appropriately funded albeit arguably not to the detriment of other projects. However, British preoccupation with law and order in the territory was manifestly reflected in the 1908 budget among other indicators in the following way: "The two largest items of the 75,801 pounds (sterling) government expenditure were, police (39,584) and railway subsidy (8,333); district administration was a poor fifth (3,584) and African social services totaled 500 pounds subsidy to trades education. There was minimal government spending even indirectly on the African population of a native territory." (Picard, 1987, p. 98)

On the one hand, the territory's population was also taxed<sup>5</sup> to generate some of the government funds which were invariably channeled mostly into the maintenance of law and order. For this reason, taxation did generate a lot of income for the colonial government and in the process, satisfied their second aim; that the colony should be able to shoulder its administrative expenses. As a ramification, "direct taxation of Africans accounted for 61 percent of all government revenues (in Bamangwato tribal area), and from 1911 - 1912 until the late colonial times, the Bechuanaland Protectorate (tax) revenue matched or exceeded expenditure." (Picard, 1987, p. 98)

The implications of this noncommittal strategy in the Protectorate on the part of the British need not be underplayed. Thus, no expenditure was incurred to develop any form of

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<sup>5</sup> Proclamation 10 of March 1899, imposed a Hut tax at the rate of 10 shillings per hut; it was later revised upward and provided for the Chiefs as tax collectors, with 10 per cent of the proceeds. The more one owned huts, the more tax one was liable to pay. It is quite normal that traditionally, a household would possess up to five huts in the same compound. "Well to do" families would even have more (huts are traditional houses made of mud and thatched with grass).

infrastructure, health, welfare and education "which were left almost entirely to the local missionary communities." (Picard, 1987, p. 98)

Subsequently, "the first schools in Botswana were established by the London Missionary Society during the early part of the 19th century.....additional schools were established and developed by the Hermannsburg Mission and by the Dutch Reformed and Catholic churches."<sup>6</sup>

The British continued to rule Botswana for eighty one years after which, Botswana got her independence on the 30th of September in 1966 and held her first ever national celebrations under the auspices of the Botswana Democratic Party.<sup>7</sup>

As a result, independence hinged heavily on the negotiations that ensued and British acquiescence to Botswana's request.

At independence, "Botswana was one of the poorest countries in Africa with an overwhelmingly rural population depended mainly on agriculture for livelihood."<sup>8</sup>

In the last decade of British rule, Botswana had ironically depended heavily on British grants in aid not only for investment projects but also to finance its recurrent expenditure as

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<sup>6</sup> Richard P. Stevens. Historical dictionary of the Republic of Botswana. Scarecrow Press, Inc.; Metuchen New Jersey, 1975, p. 55.

<sup>7</sup> At the general election held in March 1965, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) won 28 of the 31 seats in the new legislative assembly. Britain granted internal self government thereafter and independence discussions followed at the Bechuanaland Independence Conference in London in February of 1966, leading to the independence of the Republic of Botswana in the same year on 30 September.

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Finance and Development Planning; National Development Plan 7, 1991 - 1997. Government Printer, Gaborone, 1991, p. 11.

depicted by Table 1. At this point, their negligent approach had shifted toward assisting the country, albeit to a minimal level.

Table 1. Annual Payments of British Grants in Aid 1956 - 1967.

Fiscal Year	Amount (in pounds sterling)
1956/57	140,000
1957/58	480,000
1958/59	560,000
1959/60	650,000
1960/61	750,000
1961/62	1,000,000
1962/63	1,680,000
1963/64	1,300,000
1964/65	6,000,000
1965/66	3,378,000
1966/67	8,564,000

Source: Louis A. Picard, p.102.

Note: British pound = U.S. \$5

This chapter has thus far tried to paint a picture of Botswana's standing before and at independence. The chapter will now attempt to conceptually define national interest and subsequently, apply it to Botswana in a bid to deduce what the country's national interest is or has been on the basis of its history, its budget allocations and what national interests are generally deemed to be.

## A. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

National interests have been defined broadly as those national objectives any country sets itself to achieve. For this reason, the concept is very elusive and susceptible to a vast array of interpretations. According to Morgenthau, the concept of national interest is similar to the interpretation of "great generalities" of the Constitution in liberal democracies such as general welfare and due process. It contains a residual meaning which is inherent in the concept, but beyond this minimum requirements, its contents can run a whole gamut of interpretations which are logically compatible with it. To this end, "the concept of national interest then, contains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances."<sup>9</sup>

However, in pursuit of their national interests, countries have to make choices between objectives since "no nation has the resources to promote all the desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible." (Morgenthau, 1986, p.115) He argues that such rational allocation of resources is based on the premise of a manifest understanding that there is a distinction between **necessary** and **variable** elements of national interests. However, proponents and advocates of a generally extensive concept of national interest, invariably present certain variable elements as though their attainment was necessary for the survival of the nation. Thus, "necessary elements of the national interest have the tendency to swallow up the variable

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<sup>9</sup> John A. Vasquez, et al., (ed). Classics of International Relations; Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1986, p. 114.

elements so that in the end, all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of national survival." (Morgenthau, in *Classics of International Relations*, 1986, p. 115)

In pursuit of their national interest, nations invariably have to deal with one another through the medium of their respective foreign policies. This phenomenon further complicates the concept since individual national survival drives what nations term as necessary as opposed to variable interests especially when competing with other nations. As a result, "all nations do what they cannot help but do." (Morgenthau, in *Classics of International Relations*, 1986, p. 114)

The question of whether an act or omission on the part of a state is good or bad does not arise. Wolfers argues that, nations like individuals or other groups, may value things not because they value them good or less evil than their alternative. On the contrary, they may value them because they satisfy their pride, heighten their sense of self esteem or reduce their fears. Consequently, this paints the fluidity and sometimes the ambiguity of the concept.

In his famous 1939 speech, after Russia invaded Poland instead of being Poland's ally against a perceived German threat, Sir Winston Churchill succinctly defined the concept in the following way: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Robert Rhode James, (ed.) Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897 - 1963. Vol. vi 1935 - 1942. Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 1974, p. 6161.

Hartmann defines national interests of any country as a phenomenon categorized into two groups; the vital and secondary interests. Vital interests are those interests for which "the state is normally willing to fight immediately or ultimately."<sup>11</sup>

Among these vital interests is normally the question of territorial integrity and therefore its preservation. On the same spectrum, argues Hartmann, there are secondary interests which states would like to attain but would not wage war for. However, he argues that the vital and secondary interests of any country are the ones that will fashion the manner in which nations deal with one another. In essence these interests determine the complexion of foreign relations and subsequently foreign policy among states. As a result, "an ideal foreign policy once formulated, contains a systematic selection of national interests in which inconsistent interests have been weeded out, the interests have been judged against one another in terms of priorities, and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against estimated power and potential of the state to achieve those interests. (Hartmann, 1973, p. 6) To this end, no foreign policy will encompass all possible national interests at one given time save for those selected for implementation. This argument tallies with Morgenthau's observation that states have to rationalize their resources when pursuing their respective national interests. Subsequently, national interests are weighed and measured against the country's power and ability to successfully achieve them.

This argument brings in another important dimension to the question of nation interests; that of national power. The latter is also a wide and all encompassing concept; it

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<sup>11</sup> Frederick H. Hartmann. The Relations of Nations (4th ed.) The Macmillan Company; New York, 1973, p. 6.

embraces all the state's social, economic and military and political capabilities. This in essence is the ability of a nation to achieve its interests from the premise that it is perceived by others to possess such capabilities, whether such capabilities are perceived to be real, latent or in some extreme cases non existent.

Hence, national power is a *sine qua non* ingredient of the realization of national interests. Thus according to Hartmann, if countries pursue opposed policies which prove to be irreconcilable short of war, and countries pursue them nevertheless, recourse to the use of force is inevitable and it is normally manifested through war, although in some cases other measures short of war itself have been employed. Consequently, national interests generally derive their flavor from the country's ability to set and pursue them successfully.

## **B. BOTSWANA'S NATIONAL INTEREST**

Because of the numerous countries on the world stage which have to deal with each other in the name of their respective national interests, and because some may be opposed, the ultimate definition of the concept becomes complex also as a result of other internal factors which also have a bearing on the subject.

The result is that national interests are shaped by both factors within and without a country's frontiers; within its borders when dealing with its citizenry and outside its borders when dealing with its peers.

Having attempted to define the concept of national interests, the question that should arise at this juncture should be, what is or has been Botswana's national interest? To answer this question, one has to inevitably look at Botswana's socio-economic and political history, the regional setting and to some limited extent, the world stage. This chapter has attempted



to shed some light in those respects, and on that basis it will attempt to answer the above question. The argument has been categorized into two aspects; external and internal factors.

1. **External factors**

- a. *Extra-Regional Threats; the Super-Power Rivalry*

Botswana gained her independence during the height of the cold war era. This fact seems unimportant, but nevertheless, it is one aspect that needs to be reckoned with. During this time, newly politically independent countries were expected to identify with either the West which stood for liberal democracy, or the East representing communism.

Aligning with either sphere of ideological influence could facilitate their socio-economic independence as well. In this way, newly independent countries could lobby for and acquire their much needed economic and other forms of aid. Granted, Botswana was and still is a liberal democracy, one would have been inclined to argue therefore that, Botswana would have naturally preferred to tilt heavily toward the west for such assistance and be reluctant to receive the same from the east on an ideological premise.

Under the leadership of the first president of the country Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana chose to be non aligned. To this end, democracy in Botswana emphasized the aspect of unity and humanitarianism. In his speech at the Dag Hammarskjold Center in Sweden in 1970, Khama argued that Botswana sought to identify with what was positive and humane in all national ideologies. He argued that Botswana recognized certain fundamental values and held them to be universal. That what she asked of any ideology or social system was that it should wear a human face.

Thus, addressing the nation on behalf of the president, Minister Mogwe had this to say:

True to its declared policy of non alignment, Botswana enjoys diplomatic relations with all countries well disposed toward us irrespective of their political philosophy. Our relations are based on the principles of sovereign equality of states and mutual respect, on non interference in each others internal affairs.....we reject the hegemony of any power. We have no truck with spheres of influence and advancement of political doctrines. We have military agreements with no one. Paradoxically, yet true, we derive our strength from our weakness.<sup>12</sup>

As result, Botswana continued to profess her policy of non alignment even in the face of possible adverse repercussions from both the east and/or the west. Fundamental to Botswana's democracy was the condemnation of apartheid in all its forms, emphasis on human rights, and western support of the then racial South Africa prompted Botswana to cry foul even more strongly.

Hence, at a third summit conference of nonaligned states in Lusaka - Zambia in 1970, Khama had this to say:

It is for the non aligned to point out to the rival power blocs who both claim to act in the course of freedom, that we can only give credence to their claims if their policies do not ride rough-shod over the values they profess to uphold and defend. Thus the delivery of arms to South Africa and the involvement of that country in western security arrangements are not consistent with claims to defend freedom; just as the invasion of Czechoslovakia invalidated similar claims on the part of the Soviet Union. (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 93)

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<sup>12</sup> Gwendolene Carter and Philip Morgan (eds.), From the Frontline: Speeches of Sir Seretse Khama. Hoover Institution Press; Stanford University, California, 1980, p. 214.

Subsequently, non-alignment translated into identification with any country irrespective of ideology if that country upheld the principles of humanitarianism, and was well disposed toward Botswana. In this way, Botswana could lobby for and acquire her much needed economic and other forms of aid from all quarters, even though according to Seretse, such aid would be refused if it was perceived to be conditional.

***b. Regional Threats***

Pursuant to the principle of humanitarianism espoused by Botswana, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, the country committed itself to providing asylum to those fleeing political persecution in their respective countries especially in the Southern African region.

Thus, Khama had argued, "whilst we will continue to offer genuine political refugees a safe haven in our country, we will not permit such people to plan and attempt to achieve the violent overthrow of the government of any country from within the boundaries of Botswana." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 6)

Subsequently, because of Botswana's open-door policy toward political refugees, Legum observed that between 1976 and 1978, there were 30,000 refugees in the country; 20,000 of whom later became permanent residents. (Legum, in *South Africa and Its Neighbors: Regional Security and Self Interest*, 1980, p. 803).

The implications of this policy are perhaps what became Botswana's cause for concern and alarm especially in the realm of internal peace and stability. Because Botswana was vehemently opposed to racism and all its inhumanity, most political refugees invariably came from Rhodesia and South Africa. As a ramification, to these two countries, Botswana's

blatant support for the refugees was interpreted as an official pronouncement to aid and abate outlawed militant groups. These included the Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in Rhodesia; the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) *inter alia*, in South Africa come to mind.

Ian Smith had wasted no time and spared no effort in blaming Botswana for the escalated internal guerilla warfare activities in Rhodesia against his regime. Thus he "refused to reckon with the fact that the freedom fighters were operating from within Zimbabwe itself and not from Botswana or any other neighboring state."<sup>13</sup> (U.N. Yearbook, 1977, p. 217)

In response, Rhodesia perpetuated numerous cross boarder raids and military excursions into Botswana under the pretext of flushing out guerrilla operatives said to be conducting their military exploits therefrom. Smith's forces led to loss of life and property on the part of Botswana and virtually disrupted their socio-economic activities.

In a similar vein, South Africa later carried out similar military campaigns, waving the same lame excuse Rhodesia had and leaving the same repercussions in her wake. In essence, these "total onslaught" policies pursued by both regimes were aimed at nothing other than to dissuade Botswana from harboring political refugees weighed against her wish to be a sovereign, peaceful and stable.

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<sup>13</sup> For a comprehensive discussion on the background to the Rhodesian struggle, refer to a Naval Post Graduate School Masters thesis by Mabe Rabashwa Gaborone: The Search for Peace and Security: The Case of Botswana, 1994, pp. 17-21.

These military exploits nevertheless did not deter Botswana from standing up for what she believed in; she embarked on diplomatic lobbies within the U.N. and other fora.

As a ramification, Khama had argued:

Whilst Botswana accepts that we are part of a Southern African complex and that the harsh fact of history and geography cannot be obliterated, for obvious reasons, we have to maintain normal friendly relations with South Africa. But we are not deterred by our present economic weakness from speaking out for what we believe is right. We have made no secret of our detestation of apartheid, although we are obliged to interpret strictly the principle of non interference in the affairs of other sovereign states. We have condemned the theory of apartheid, nor would we fail to condemn a similar policy wherever it occurs. (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 53)

In the interim, American foreign policy in Southern Africa did not help much to arrest the situation. Pursuant to the "Truman Doctrine" against communism, South Africa was considered to be the west's last defense against the Russians in Africa. Hence, taking punitive action against apartheid South Africa, an ally against perceived Soviet threat would have been a serious gamble with American national interests.<sup>14</sup>

Consequently, South Africa evolved into a strong western "delinquent arm." As a ramification, "South Africa was stronger within its region than ever before. It could dictate or at least strongly affect the political, economic and logistical decisions of its neighbors. It listened little to the exhortations of the United States and hardly feared

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<sup>14</sup> For further insight into U.S. policy in Southern Africa, refer to The Management of Security Assistance, D.S.A.A., 1980, pp. 1-21.

expressions of Soviet displeasure. Acting with impunity within the region, and even extending its economic ambit beyond, to offshore islands and into eastern and West Africa."<sup>15</sup>

In the interim, the government of Botswana had delayed plans to establish a permanent army because of opportunity costs related to military expenditure. There was in the governments view, an immense pressure for all the available resources to be channeled into development. This was a valid reason by any standard considering the state of economic underdevelopment in which the country found itself at independence.

To this end, the Police Mobile (PMU), an offshoot of the original BBP was the sole government instrument charged with safeguarding not only internal law and order, but also repelling external threats.

As a result of the aforementioned Rhodesian and South African military escapades, Parliament passed a "Botswana Defense Force (BDF) bill on 25 March 1977" providing for both a regular and reserve force in a bid to uphold the sanctity of the country's sovereign territorial integrity, internal peace and stability. Estimates attributable to the Rhodesian cross border operations were at least P65 million (U.S. 52 million in 1976 dollars) and "the BDF formed in April 1977 to counter that threat cost another P20 million (U.S. 16 million in 1976 dollars).<sup>16</sup> (New African Yearbook, 1979, p. 92)

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<sup>15</sup> Robert I. Rotberg , et al., South Africa and its Neighbors: Regional Security and Self interest. Lexington Books, Toronto, 1985, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> For further information on in-depth discussion on the BDF background, see Gaborone, 1994, pp. 29-31.

To this end, territorial integrity, internal peace and stability can be argued to be one of Botswana's national interests, perhaps as they would for any other sovereign polity. Refer to Tables 2a and 2b (i) and 2b (ii) for military expenditure.

## **2. Internal factors**

### ***a. Social and Political Considerations***

At independence, Botswana had set for herself the following guiding principles; democracy, development, self reliance and unity which became the platform upon which all her socio-economic and political activities, together with her foreign relations would be based.<sup>17</sup>

As a result, Botswana's national interest was internally driven by its socio-economic inadequacies prevalent at independence. It is worthy to mention that as a democracy, Botswana was founded on the basis of a constitution guaranteeing rights and individual liberties.<sup>18</sup>

For this reason, when Botswana came into existence, there were already four active political parties in existence; these were, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Botswana People's Party, the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and the Botswana National Front (BNF). It is not the intention of this chapter to discuss the subject pertaining to political parties in depth.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> For further explanation on these principles, refer to Carter and Morgan, 1980, pp. 83-86.

<sup>18</sup> See Stevens, 1975, p. 34, for an elaborate discussion on the Constitution of Botswana.

<sup>19</sup> Refer to Stevens, 1975, pp. 25-28, for further discussions on Botswana's political parties.

Table 2a. Summary of Planned Development Expenditure by Ministry.

SUMMARY OF PLANNED DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE BY MINISTRY

Ministry	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	Total in Category 'A' (Constant Prices)	Total in Category 'B' (Constant Prices)	Total (Constant Prices)	Total (Current Prices)
Office of the President (including Parliament and Administration of Justice)	1 865	5 007	5 196	4 174	3 171	2 601	18 100	3 914	22 014	29 240
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning	14 556	21 172	3 449	496	303	280	40 256	—	40 256	44 927
Ministry of Home Affairs	960	2 120	2 870	2 540	2 332	2 340	11 842	1 320	13 162	18 081
Ministry of Agriculture	7 065	17 380	30 099	12 636	10 392	8 744	83 244	3 072	86 316	113 343
Ministry of Education	8 545	11 391	12 639	9 890	7 929	6 861	51 650	5 605	57 255	75 025
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	5 405	4 326	2 741	2 258	2 417	2 575	19 332	390	19 722	25 029
Ministry of Local Government and Lands	13 738	23 358	28 399	27 643	27 735	25 315	127 888	18 300	146 188	200 085
Ministry of Works and Communications	27 184	41 546	50 836	42 670	36 587	34 621	213 031	20 413	233 444	312 981
Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs	4 177	5 958	8 425	5 698	4 601	5 115	33 196	778	33 974	45 193
Ministry of Health	1 971	4 577	4 278	3 443	2 762	3 308	18 827	1 512	20 339	27 234
Drought Relief	4 556	2 143	—	—	—	—	6 699	—	6 699	6 956
Botswana Defence Force	15 000	9 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	56 000	—	56 000	72 317
GRAND TOTAL	105 022	147 978	156 932	119 448	106 229	99 760	680 065	55 304	735 369	970 411

Source: NDP, p. 7.



Table 2b(i). Summary of Expenditure.\*

	91/92	92/93	93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97	Totals (Current Prices)
OP + Pasl + Justice	63,309	54,111	37,410	27,190	26,970	29,710	238,700
MOFDP	89,208	80,062	60,020	50,710	52,730	51,470	384,200
Home Affairs	16,471	21,114	15,615	9,490	3,250	2,260	68,200
Agriculture	39,200	32,830	25,160	17,840	17,280	18,390	150,700
Education	104,554	127,496	120,960	136,540	132,960	131,890	754,400
Commerce	8,741	16,939	20,430	21,020	20,260	15,910	103,300
MLGL	349,485	388,665	208,020	200,500	194,590	200,940	1,542,200
Works	214,650	258,980	248,200	227,160	201,110	177,500	1,327,600
Mineral Resources	102,977	157,952	158,566	197,780	259,150	250,775	1,121,200
Health	46,099	46,986	54,545	49,620	34,450	29,500	260,800
BDF	200,000	220,000	125,000	140,000	90,000	100,000	875,000

Source: NDP, p. 7

Table 2b(ii). Summary of Expenditures.\*

	91/92	92/93	93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97	Totals (Constant Prices)
OP + Parl + Justice	63,309	49,301	31,090	20,500	18,500	18,500	201,200
MOFDP	89,208	72,892	49,800	38,300	36,200	32,100	318,500
Home Affairs	16,471	18,999	12,800	7,200	2,200	1,400	59,070
Agriculture	39,200	29,950	20,800	13,350	11,750	11,250	126,300
Education	104,554	115,546	499,750	102,350	90,600	81,700	594,500
Commerce	8,741	15,499	16,960	15,850	13,950	10,000	81,000
MLGL	349,485	353,765	171,800	150,500	132,900	124,650	1,283,100
Works	214,650	236,400	205,600	171,300	137,500	110,550	1,076,000
Mineral Resources	102,977	137,907	131,386	149,110	175,760	157,760	854,900
Health	46,099	42,501	45,250	37,450	23,450	18,350	213,100
BDF	200,000	200,000	100,000	100,000	50,000	50,000	700,000

Source: NDP, p. 7.

\* Legend to Tables 2b(I) and 2b(ii):

O.P.	= Office of President
Parl.	= Parliament
MOFDP	= Ministry of Finance & Development Planning
Home Affairs	= Ministry of Home Affairs
Agriculture	= Ministry of Agriculture
Education	= Ministry of Education
Commerce	= Ministry of Commerce and Industry
MLGL	= Ministry of Local Governments and Lands
Works	= Ministry of Works, Communications and Transport
Mineral Resources	= Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs
Health	= Ministry of Health
BDF	= Botswana Defence Force

Source: NDP 7, pp. 77-81.

Note: All figures are in millions of Pula; currency equivalence: 1 U.S. dollar = 3 Bots. Pula.

Pursuant to the notion of democracy pursued prior to independence, the BDP pledged to work with other opposing parties if they were mandated to run the country, and as long as such association was done in a positive manner. Khama had argued, "the democratic Party will not stifle opposition and criticism, but will in fact, welcome all responsible criticism of the creative type, as only by responsible and creative criticism can a truly democratic state be assured." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 9)

As a ramification and pursuant to unity, after the BDP won the first elections, government set to the task of unifying the country. Historically, the country was made up of eight principal tribes; Bakwena, Bakgatla, Bangwato, Batawana, Bangwaketse, Balete, Batlokwa and Barolong. There were also some formerly subjected minor tribes in existence among which were, Basarwa (bushmen), Bakalaka and Basubia.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See Stevens, 1975, p. 143, for an in-depth discussion on the Tswana tribal history.

For this reason Khama had argued that true independence could not be realized if ethnic cleavages were left to go unchecked as exemplified in other civil strife torn countries across the length and breadth of Africa. To this end, by 1978 Hartland-Thundberg was able to observe the following: "The Batswana are in fact eight main tribes, all of which speak the same language, Setswana, although English is the official tongue. These tribes are mercifully free of traditional tribal animosities that so frequently rend other African nations."<sup>21</sup> To this end, Batswana view themselves not as different tribes in the country but as a homogenous and single group.

***b. Economic Considerations; Development***

According to the seventh National Development Plan (NDP 7)<sup>22</sup> Botswana was one of the poorest countries in Africa at independence. This is no surprise if one recalls the history of Botswana alluded to before. Thus, development and self reliance became the pivotal pillars upon which economic development would be pursued.

In his 1970 speech, Khama had this to say; "we are well aware that we are still a largely undeveloped, sparsely populated country, whose first concern must be our own development. We must put the highest priority on our development effort if independence

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<sup>21</sup> Penelope Hartland-Thundberg; Botswana: An African growth economy; Westview Press; Boulder, Colorado, 1978, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup> The National development Plan (NDP) is Botswana government's six year blueprint document of public expenditure. It outlines national policies and objectives to be adopted and pursued based on careful planning. At the end of each six year life cycle of each plan, government has the opportunity to review past plans, institute modifications and initiate new policies and programs to facilitate future development. In essence, government guides economic planning through the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. However, the private sector has input through the National economic and Advisory council (NEAC) and government realizes the importance of such input.

is to have real meaning for our people. We recognize that we are not a world power to be reckoned with in the highest international circles. No other country trembles when we speak. We have no army. The machinery through which we conduct our diplomatic affairs is fairly rudimentary." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 82) Consequently, development became Botswana's national interest if only out of necessity rather than choice. To this end, she proceeded to lobby for economic and other forms of aid from all corners of the world irrespective of ideological considerations. However, such aid could only be accepted if and only if there were no perceived "strings" attached to it, political or otherwise. Hence, "we have in recent years received generous budgetary and development assistance from the British. We have attracted aid from other sources including the United States. We have set ourselves a policy of attracting overseas investment and aid from as many different sources as possible. We ask donors only that they should not impose conditions on their aid which would threaten our independence and our democratic and non racial way of life." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 59) Please refer to Table 3 below for government expenditure on socio-economic development. Also note that Tables 2a through 2b (ii) depict such expenditure.

*c. Self Reliance*

The last principle upon which the national interest of Botswana derived its flavor, was the concept of self reliance. Much as Botswana was to depend on foreign aid and investment, government consistently chartered the country toward "self reliance." This invariably meant harnessing all national resources to enable the country to limit heavy reliance on foreign support. Government had argued that it would be asking too much and unjustified to continue lobbying for and acquiring aid, while demonstrating no potential capabilities to


be "independent" of external support. To this end, Botswana had "to demonstrate to donor countries that we shall not be seeking aid forever and that we are seeking only that aid and investment from abroad which will enable us to stand on our own feet." (Carter and Morgan, 1980, p. 85)

As a ramification, it can be argued therefore that, indeed, Botswana's national interest was molded on the four principle alluded to before. The result being that, development (socio-economic), democracy (to include peace, stability and human rights), self reliance and unity were the pillars upon which Botswana's national interest rested and still rests.

#### *d. Summary*

Based on the history of Botswana, the conceptual definition of national interests, the four already discussed and budget allocations depicted by Tables 2a through 3, the national interest of Botswana can be said to be; socio-economic development, territorial sovereignty and democracy in all its forms to include peace, stability, security and humanitarianism. The aforementioned tables clearly depict a trend of emphasis on socio-economic development except when internal security has been crucially threatened. Consequently, more emphasis has been placed on military expenditure in an attempt to preserve it. With the advent of independence in neighboring Zimbabwe and South Africa, such expenditure on the military has been gradually declining and more emphasis is placed on social and economical expenditure. In conclusion, if history is anything to go by, the national interest of Botswana will continue to bear the same flavor it has borne through the years.

Table 3. Botswana Military Expenditure.



Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1992.

### **III. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION AND THE EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

This paper analyzes integration as a viable path to abate the socio-economic and political ills that plague the world in general, with particular reference to Southern Africa. Be that as it may, it does not advocate integration as a panacea for these shortcomings, but perhaps as the best currently available and operational option in mankind's quest for socio-economic growth and political freedom. This concept becomes even more chronologically relevant in the wake of an international order that has been dubbed, in some academic fora as "triumphant liberalism". The latter is manifested in the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it, the twentieth century historical and ideological rival of liberal democracy - communism. Consequently, a new trend in the nature of international politics has emerged.

In the most recent historical epoch (cold war era), one could almost always define a sense of historical progression stretched out between two bipolar centers (East/West), and the inherent subsequent national differences. In this way, unilateral national acts or omissions could be predicted on the basis of national ideological alignment which also set the stage for the rules of engagement. Stability was maintained, the world became a safe place for mankind even though such safety depended on the said ideological and subsequent differences.

The rise of the U.S. led liberal democracy to international hegemony paints a somewhat blurry picture of what the inter-state rules of engagement are or ought to be in the new international political arena. Instead of giving rise to hope for a better world, it fosters unparalleled pessimism generated by the illusive nature of what Zbigniew Brzezinski refers

to as "dilemmas of social existence." Hence, "The fall of communism thus raises the question of whether its defeat is tantamount to victory of democracy in a comprehensive, systematic, and endemic way."<sup>23</sup> (Brzezinski, 1993, p. 54)

As a result, the fall of communism has its own inherent ambivalence which could foster global or regional integration, or damn it forever owing to nations pursuing national agendas. This phenomenon highlights what has been referred to as centrifugal and centripetal forces. Aldo Ferrer observed this scenario in the following way:

The complexity of the international system today does not advise simplistic definitions. The tendency towards globalization and the need to affirm national identities coexist in this context; The development of new forms of organization and association which transcend the nation state paradoxically coexist with the tendency towards the reaffirmation of national sovereignty and prerogatives.<sup>24</sup>

Hence, if these factors of disunity, jingoistic pursuits exist, perhaps we should take comfort in the fact that they also exist side by side with our ability to integrate. I would therefore ascribe the above not only to the vacuum created largely by the demise of communism, but also to the inability of the world to create or define a new paradigm. In effect, the long awaited "new world order" shepherded by liberal democracy, which to many has been visibly defined by the post cold war era, is in my considered opinion a new world

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<sup>23</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1993, p. 54.

<sup>24</sup> Fernando Jorge Cardoso, et al, Report on Open Integration: Third Euro-Latin American Forum. Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon, 1995.



order still in the making. Matthew Arnold's vivid theatrical observation captures this fact:

"We are wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other unable to be born."<sup>25</sup>

It is in this undefined system that ethno-centricism, nationalism and other equally captivating and mass agitating dogmas can be and have been invoked, leading to obvious civil strife. Europe and Africa have not been spared in this regard. However, the thrust of this paper is not to spell doom and gloom for humanity.

In my view, the post cold war era is a historically opportune moment for the "internationalization" of liberal democracy. It is in this era that the latter becomes a possible reality as opposed to a far fetched liberal utopian hypothesis. It is arguable therefore that, with the pandemic of democracy the world over, integration among states is bound to play a pivotal role. Aldo Ferrer could not have put it any better;

Reality shows that today's great challenges, be they democratization, the control of extreme forms of nationalism and religious or ethnic fundamentalism, the resolution of inter- or - intra- state conflicts as well as the problems of a demographic nature and poverty, require political, economic and strategic responses which transcend the capabilities of any single power. This includes the United States which is still debating the role it should play in the post cold war era. (Ohmae, 1995, p.7) (emphasis added)

With this background in mind, it is therefore in order to discuss the concept of integration itself.

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<sup>25</sup> Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State. The Rise of Regional Economies. Free Press, New York, 1995.

## A. THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION

Perhaps the most appropriate approach would be to discuss what integration is not. Common use of the term invokes a sense of some phenomenon akin to what is defined in the sphere of political science as regionalism. The latter is defined by Leroy Bennett as; "A segment of the world bound together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic, or political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in informal intergovernmental agreements." <sup>26</sup>

Thus, regionalism although possessing the underlying characteristics and objectives of integration, is lacking politically in that nations still wield their political sovereignty. Integration on the other hand, is a relatively new concept. Webster's dictionary defines integration as "to make or become whole or complete" and "to bring (parts) together into a whole." Intuitively, this means annihilating all the differences that may exist between parts and thus making them one! This is the idealistic definition of integration. Therefore, integration goes a step further than regionalism. It strives for a complete merger in between states even at a political level. The classic case of the European Union comes to mind at this juncture. However, integrating states necessarily have to be democratic. As a result, liberal democracy becomes an important ingredient for the process. Fernando Jorge Cardoso defines integration as:

A freely adopted association of states legitimized by democracy. It is based on a clear legal foundation. It presupposes the desire to achieve a significant degree of economic policy convergence. It must create the institutions necessary to attain shared objectives and resolve differences through

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<sup>26</sup> A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations, Principles and Issues. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1995.

negotiation. If it is to contribute to a more stable international order, integration should both be economically and politically open." (Cardoso, et al., 1995, p. 11)

Subsequently, the idealistic conception of integration, especially regional integration is in fact a microcosm of universalism. However, in practice, nationalism in all its forms has equated integration with regionalism for various reasons; ideology, inter-national economic disparities, sovereignty, and especially the absence of democracy within and without national frontiers.

Hence the argument for a historically opportune moment for the internationalization of democracy, which would act as a spring board for "integration." Having risen out of the need for inter state concerted efforts against socio-economic and political ills that could breed conflict, and as rule found on a democratic basis, integration has the following two aspects:

#### **B. CONVERGING INTERESTS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT**

Humanity possesses an inherent paradoxical quality regarding its interests; homogeneity and heterogeneity. Since nations are composed of human beings, they ipso facto wield the same qualities and the power to harmonize both. With regard to integration, institutions or "clearing houses" should be created in order to tap this ability to harmonize interests especially divergent ones, which are a potential source of conflict in a democratic atmosphere. Failure to exercise democracy in these fora, relegates integrative processes to nothing but the enunciation of grand objectives. The assumption is that, democracy in fact rears a sense of openness among states and therefore promotes mutual respect for inherent differences like culture, civilization, economic disparities, etc. According to Cardoso:

Democracy has less to do with rigid models of political and social organization and more to do with respect for fundamental rights, the international rule of law, peaceful solution of conflicts, strengthening of international cooperation and the use of political and economic integration mechanisms to guarantee the protection of shared interests. (Cardoso, et al., 1995, p. 17)

### **C. THE ROLE OF TOLERANCE**

Because of the inherent centripetal and centrifugal forces conniving against the world today, tolerance becomes an important aspect in world affairs particularly with regard to integration. It should therefore not be limited in scope to the classical religious or political tolerances. Rather, it should be extended to embrace linguistic, ethnic, cultural, racial and other aspects of social existence. This becomes important in that it would breed peaceful co-existence between states, despite their differences bred by their inequalities and perhaps inadequacies in some instances. As Cardoso observes and rightly so: "The broader vision of tolerance is necessary to achieve peaceful co-existence in an international system characterized by strong elements of discontinuity and heterogeneity, whose strength feeds the logic of fragmentation but is also capable of achieving unification." (Cardoso, et al., 1995, p. 17)

Consequently, democracy becomes an important ingredient for tolerance as it inevitably presupposes the recognition of the Other. This fosters negotiation as a vehicle of interstate interactions and invariably calls for the readiness on the part of the players to compromise. In this way, complex and sensitive differences, some pertaining to sovereignty and state autonomy, can be reconciled.

The result is that, no single view point is imposed by force, and persuasion rather than imposition becomes the order of the day. Persuasion arises out of the recognition of the Other and therefore, the Other's capacity for reason. It has been argued that there is not one truth, that truth is in fact multi-faceted. Subsequently, to unfathom the universal truth requires a great deal of tolerance if this argument is upheld:

One becomes aware of the fact that tolerance is essential when one realizes that in a world of no defined polarities, it is impossible to reconcile conflicting logics. Thus the need to find a *modus vivendi* within the international system which will make centripetal and centrifugal forces compatible through a process of mutual recognition and successive approximations. (Bennett, 1995, p. 18)

Consequently, interstate tolerance is expressed when power ceases to be the criterion that guides nation- to- nation relations. Powerful countries do not impose their views/will on their weaker partners because, it is with the accommodation of their weak partners that a solid, coherent whole can be built. Hence, negotiation becomes a permanent and continuous feature of democratic tolerance.

So far this paper has dealt with the concept of integration primarily from a political and ethical perspective. Integration in its totality does not only deal with the political aspect of human co-existence; it also embraces the social and economic aspects. With this notion in mind therefore, social integration becomes an important windfall brought about by economic integration.

The latter has been identified to lie on a continuum; from the existence of a free trade area on one end, to the establishment of complete economic integration. According to Bela Balassa, economic integration: "can take several forms that represent varying degrees of

integration. These are a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration."<sup>27</sup>

In a free trade area, economic restrictions between participating countries are abolished but each country sets its own controls or restrictions against non members. A customs union on the other hand, not only endeavors to suppress commodity movement discriminations between the members, it also tries to set equivalent trade restrictions with non members, e.g., tariffs.

In a common market, both inter-trade restrictions and restrictions on factor movements are abolished. Subsequently, factors of production like labor and capital also wield uninhibited inter country movement. An economic union differs from a common market in that it strives constantly to suppress any form of economic discrimination that could arise due to commodity and factor disparities among the states.

Total economic integration takes the process even further than the common market; it becomes a merger between integrating states in all economic endeavors, and presupposes the existence of a political authority whose directives or decisions are binding and paramount to those of the integrating states. In effect, total economic integration is political in its nature.

The question that should be addressed at this point is why countries integrate; are the underlying reasons socio-economic, are they political, or on the other hand, are they a mixture of all these aspects? The answer to this question should in my mind dictate the form by which countries should come together in the already discussed integration continuum.

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<sup>27</sup> Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G Stubb (eds.) The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. Lynne Rienner, Boulder Colorado, 1994.

To this end, this chapter attempts to look briefly into the workings of the European Union (EU); why the organization was incepted in the first instance, how it operates and what stumbling blocks has the EU come across and what applications if any, can be drawn from it for Botswana?

#### **D. INTEGRATION: THE EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Some scholars have argued that, although the European Union has come to be what we know it to be in the aftermath of the second world war, the concept of a United Europe can be found "amidst the chaos of feudalism" in the 11th century.

In this era, social order and European unity was maintained by papal claims to universal authority under the banner of Christianity. The division into the east and west Christianity in 1054 sowed the first seeds of fragmentation in Christian Europe and "men and women harassed by the extortions of the lord of the manor, began to seek protection under the territorial prince." <sup>28</sup>

Subsequently, social order was maintained by political units; the great princes who according to Schmitt, committed on a grand scale what robber barons had perpetrated from behind the fastness of their mountain haunts.

This invariably led to social anarchy and a subsequent call for European unity by both the meek for protection and, the mighty who saw it as a platform for their hegemonic dreams. This social order was to be entrusted to a gathering of kings, princes and ambassadors who represented diverse interests, and it is no surprise then that the situation did not abate.

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<sup>28</sup> Hans A. Schmitt; The Path to the European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the Common Market. Louisiana State University Press, 1962.

In the seventeenth century therefore (1650), the Quakers saw international organization in Europe as the solution for the warring European rulers. Hence; "in 1693, William Penn called for a European Parliament, not a democratic gathering but an institution representing peoples rather than princes. John Beller, his coreligionist, wished to divide Europe into one hundred constituencies, each to send one representative to a European Senate." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 4)

These notions of a United Europe rallied no support. Europe still experienced social turmoil brought about by the lack of peace and the subsequent civil strife. Thus according to Schmitt, the task of finding the right throne for the right prince kept armies and diplomats in constant agitation. However, plans to unite Europe seemed to take root and appealed more to the principle of arbitration: "A court was to replace the diplomatic conference as the agent of peace." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 5)

The French revolution did endow men with the thinking that freedom was the only key to peace and order; and Constantine Francois Volney clearly buttressed this new way of thought: "Let us banish all tyranny....let us form but one society....and soon mankind will have but one constitution....but one law, that of nature; one code, that of reason; one throne, that of justice; one altar, that of union." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 5)

However, Europe had her share of peace and economic well being that was tied to it. It is in this time that the idea of a United Europe was somewhat relegated to the periphery of mens minds, only to be vividly recalled later with the advent of "Hitlerism" in Germany. It is during this time according to Schmitt that, Hitler joyfully described the Eastern European Front as the melting pot from which a "European" race was to pour forth.



The German objective was not order for Europe but its conquest. This is the very phenomenon that Europe has been trying to rid itself of for centuries. As a ramification, the only plausible solution seemed to be a united front against Germany which culminated with the allied victory over Hitler in the second world war. In the interim, a committee on the workings of the European question had reservations on this issue. However; "At the end of the war, its reservations born of German excesses, vanished with victory." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 15)

Hence, the question of a United Europe gained momentum primarily in the post war rehabilitation of European economies, where the United States necessarily had to play a major role "until America became converted to the cause, peace brought a visible deceleration to the European momentum. Before the panaceas of tomorrow could be brought to fruition, the bare existence of today had to be assured. Without necessities there would be no survival, without survival no Europe in any form." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 16)

As a result, American aid flowed to Europe under the Marshall Plan and thanks to communist pride, it excluded the Soviet Union. The latter had now in the minds of Western countries resuscitated once again, the fear of external aggression and domination; and the Truman Doctrine became America's and invariably Europe's answer to the Soviet threat.

The Treaty of Brussels signed on the 17th of March in 1948 between Britain, France and the Benelux had "called for collective self defense and.....economic, social and cultural collaboration." (Schmitt, 1962, p. 35)

This Treaty led to the inception of the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO), which gave rise to the European Defense Community (EDC) for defense matters and later the

Council of Europe (COE) as an expression of Pan Europeanism. This feeling was buttressed by Sir Winston Churchill earlier in 1946 at Zurich university when he had called for a "United States of Europe." Nevertheless, the COE was relegated to a mere consultative body without any powers to do anything except make recommendations to the ministers. Consequently, the Council became what Shanks referred to as "a mere talking shop without any powers."

This ipso facto meant that the Council failed to provide a genuine European Parliament in the strictest parliamentary sense. Its members were primarily national politicians whose main interests were in and to their respective legislatures. Hence the COE was relegated to dealing with social and cultural matters. On the other hand, American non support of the Brussels Treaty and emphasis on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an organization with an Atlantic as opposed to a European image frustrated the pan European mood.

Hence the BTO receded into the background while NATO took center stage because Europe could not hope to cope with her own security arrangements unilaterally without U.S. assistance both militarily and economically. As if it was not enough, the outbreak of the Korean war only served to show how Europe was vulnerable to Soviet attack, and NATO seemed to provide the answer to this threat.

As a result, the EDC had been superseded by NATO, and just as the Marshall Plan had shown in the economic sphere, Europe needed America for her survival! The collapse of the EDC gave rise to the Western European Union (WEU) which included the Six and Britain, a somewhat security oriented but shaky organization.

Prior to the formation of the EDC and the COE, the Six had invited Britain to join and found the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 to which Britain declined. Nevertheless ECSC was found on the basis of two premises, economical and political; economically it would abolish trade barriers for these products between member countries and strengthen their economies in the process. Politically it would entail the establishment of supranational control in this area, it would also annihilate any future potential conflict between Germany and France. In essence, it would bring the member countries closer together on the political level strengthening the concept of Pan Europeanism.

The success of the ECSC was manifest since it dealt with the economic aspect and in the process yielded industrial benefits. To this end, more Europeans started to think that perhaps the best way to unite Europe was to begin on an economic plane. "The Europeans had learned the lesson of the failure of the Council of Europe and the EDC, compared to the success of the ECSC. If Europe was to be united, it must be through economic rather than through political means."<sup>29</sup>

The success of the ECSC led to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in June of 1955 in Sicily, out of which the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market were born. The former was designed along the same lines as ECSC except it dealt with atomic energy among the Six at a "supranational" level. The Treaty of Rome in 1957 had established EURATOM for both economic and political reasons as well.

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<sup>29</sup> Michael Shanks and John Lambert, The Common Market Today and Tomorrow, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

Economically, atomic power was thought to be the answer to Europe's post war energy deficiencies although the primacy of EURATOM was undercut by the extensive use of oil and natural gas for energy requirements. Politically, EURATOM became Europe's answer to catching up with Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of nuclear development and research. The role of EURATOM therefore became one of initiation and coordination. "There was never any suggestion that it should take over, even less control, the national programs. Its task was, and is, to ensure their harmonious development." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 107)

Up to this point, one can safely argue that attempts to unify Europe, in line with the concept of integration per se, still fell short of the mark. If anything, European countries simply banded together more for economic expedience than for political integration.

Perhaps a more radical move toward integration found its beginnings with the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market, provided for by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. It involved nothing less than a complete merger of the economies of the Six so that they could become at least in the economic sphere, a single state.

It thus defined objectives, the *modus operandi* for reaching those objectives and further set up institutions to facilitate these grand objectives. The architects of the EEC having learned from both the successes of the ECSC and the EDC fiasco realized that "the foundations of political unity must be laid in the economic sphere.." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 44) for success to be guaranteed although it was not synonymous with dramatic surrender of national sovereignty.

In this way, the long run final objectives of the Common Market were what mattered most; "but the details of how they are to be achieved, and their immediate effects, depend upon a never ceasing process of compromise, discussion, consultation and conciliation." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 45) (emphasis added)

The above phenomenon was to be carried out through the following institutions; the Commission, the Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the Council of Ministers and the European Court.

### **1. The Commission**

The Commission, according to Shanks, was the "guardian of the Treaty"; it ensured that it was fully and fairly applied. On taking office, members swore an oath to maintain full independence and therefore serve only the interests of the Community (thus, applying the Treaty of Rome without fear or favor).

Each member was in charge of a particular field of economic or social relations, e.g., transport, agriculture, health etc., but the Community was collectively responsible for its actions. Under the Commission was an administrative apparatus employing some 3000 people from the Six at its inception. These were initially responsible for the creation of legislation governing the relations of states and citizens of Europe in any matter under the umbrella of the Treaty.

The said legislation would be made in consultation with all the relevant players of the signatories. For example, free movement of workers would involve the Commission with departments of countries concerned and, employers and workers' organizations and all other

bodies with a direct interest; plus national representatives and experts. Formal proposals would be made and forwarded to the Council for decision making.

It is in order to mention that, although the Council of Ministers has the final authority in making decisions based on the recommendations of the Commission, it necessarily has to consult with the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee before it hands down its decisions.

## **2. The Parliament**

The Common Assembly of 1952 consisting of 71 members of parliament from the Six, whose job was to exercise parliamentary control over the workings of the ECSC, in effect provided a stepping stone for the genesis of the European Parliamentary Assembly. The latter's responsibility, whose membership composed of the doubled original 71, was to oversee the workings of all three Communities; ECSC, EURATOM and the Common Market.

In March of 1962, the Assembly officially decided to call itself the European Parliament, although its members were not elected to parliament but were appointed delegates from their respective national parliaments. The other drawback was that, the parliament had no legislative authority; it merely gave its opinions on matters before the Council - over which it had no power at all.

However, it has drawn its influence from its ability to make the High Authority or the Commissions resign by passing a vote of censure. It is unlikely that it would do so presently and it would also have no say in their replacement in the event that it does pass that vote.

Voting is conducted along party rather than national lines. Perhaps the true nature of this Parliament is summarized by Shanks as follows;

The Parliament is a deceptive institution. Anyone attending its sessions and hearing the detailed technical debates or the impassioned on political integration may tend to over-estimate its importance. Lacking the essential characteristic of a democratic parliament- direct contact with the electors, it remains a phantom assembly; it enacts the role of a parliament, but it has no powers and its members no constituencies. (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 50)

### **3. The Economic and Social Committee**

This Committee was set up as a vehicle through which various economically interested parties within the Common Market could have their voice heard; for example, the trade unions, employers organizations, professions like lawyers, economists, atomic experts and so on. Modeled along the same lines as the ECSC consultative committee of workers, employers and consumers, its members are appointed by the Council based on government submissions.

It strives to accommodate all parties concerned on any issue discussed by it so that ultimately a compromise is struck. With its highly technical, economic and social capability, it is in my view analogous to a think tank. Thus, "the Committees major role in its first four years has been as a forum for views of the various sectors, enabling the Commission to estimate the reaction that its proposals have provoked throughout the member countries." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 51)

It is my considered opinion therefore that the Committee's responsibility will not stray fundamentally away from this initial premise.

#### **4. The Council of Ministers**

The Council is composed of Foreign Ministers of the members and has permanent Secretariat based in Brussels. Other ministers from member countries may join the deliberations of the Council particularly, if such deliberations affect their particular sectors. The Council takes decisions on matters brought before it by the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee and consequently bringing those recommendations into effect. Because recommendations from Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee are compromises in themselves, they are ipso facto bound to contain some elements with which members are not in agreement. Thus, it is the duty of the Secretariat to make final concessions with the help of national experts on such "pending" issues before they are submitted to the council. Hence; "Once this sifting process is complete, the only problems which are put to the Ministers are those where a major decision, which only the minister himself has the authority to make, is required to concessions needed for agreement." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 52)

As a ramification, having worked together over a long time, the ministers tend to appreciate each others problems. For this reason, opposition of member states on issues even before the Council is taken into cognizance and "always a compromise is sought." (Shanks and Lambert, 1962, p. 52)

The Treaty also provides for a unanimous vote of the Council in order to make amendments in the Commissions proposals even where a majority decision is possible. Once the Council adopt matters before it, they become law through out the Community and the Commission draws directives for their implementation.



These directives have to be approved as well by the Council and the Commission then ensures compliance by member states. Should any member flout the Treaty or the Council's decisions, the commission then; writes a letter to the culprit state requiring an explanation and a "motivated opinion" requiring an end to such an act. If all fails, then the Commission takes recourse to justice and brings the violator before the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

## **5. The Court**

The Court is to the European Communities what the International Court of Justice is to the United Nations. However, the Court extends its justice within the Community, not only to members and institutions but also to individuals and all parties are bound by its decisions. Consequently, it is the final authority in the interpretations of the Treaties within the Community.

It is composed of seven judges (two Italians and one from each member country), two advocates general (one French and one German). When a dispute is taken to the Court, the conflicting parties first present their cases in writing, exchange arguments and supply documentary evidence. A public hearing where both parties present their cases.

This is followed by a further hearing at which one of the Advocates General provides his own impartial view on the merits of the matter and what he considers could be a fair judgement by the court. Because the latter is merely an expert interpretation of the Treaty in light of the issue in question, the Court is not bound by his deliberations. Nonetheless, the Court infrequently deviates from his recommendations when it gives its ruling.

The mere fact that the Court's ruling is binding and cannot be appealed, has made this institution a very powerful one within the Community. However, since these rulings derive their authority from the interpretation of the Treaties, it has been argued that in effect, this very exercise leaves room for further interpretations, thereby not making these binding rulings as watertight as they should ideally be.

#### IV. SUMMARY

These then are the essential institutional frameworks created to facilitate the development of the Common Market (within the Community), although other organs such as the European Investment Bank also play their part. Thus, the ultimate aim and objective of the Common Market is to merge the economies of the member states into one, by breaking down the barriers between them and providing common policies.

It is not the intention of this chapter to home onto the finer nitty gritty of the workings of the Community like; common immigration and migration policies, labor movement, anti cartelization laws, agriculture, and general economic growth oriented policies to mention just a few. Suffice it to say nonetheless that, all these measures have been implemented and with some measure of tangible success.

Up to this point, we have seen that Europe has managed to forge some form of economic "integration" (the E.U.); all the necessary infrastructure for facilitating this phenomenon is in place. However, there is a gray area in the system in that the necessary political dosage is inadequate. Recall that although the Council of Ministers gives the necessary authority to its operations which then bind the members, these ministers are still responsible to their respective governments and elected to office by their nationals at home.

Although the operations of the Council are based on compromise, would it be farfetched to argue that elected officials the world over, tend to know which side their bread is buttered? I do not think so. Could this then be a presenting problem for the Common

Market? The answer to this question in my mind can be found by further investigation into the workings of the Common Market or could it now be termed a European Union?

Since the completion of the common Market in 1968, the European Community has been striving constantly for a metamorphosis to which the French have unapologetically referred to as "the relaunching of Europe," perhaps toward the birth of a new entity. This renewed vigor for overhauling the community is a result of the inadequacy of the latter's political clout; in effect, the members constant retention of their national sovereignties.

The community per se is not only the fruit of history and necessity, but also of political will. In his famous Bruges speech in 1989, Jacques Delors argues that: "Despite the success of our Community based on the rule of law, disputes about sovereignty continue. We need to face the issues squarely." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 57) To this end, emphasis on natural sovereignty seemed to threaten the very existence of the community at that time.

I shall not endeavor to document all the European's contributions from Charles De Gaulle to Jacques Delors. However, I shall make references to some in order to emphasize the point of my argument. As I have already argued, the once highly eulogized concept of a "United States of Europe" seems to be sabotaged by national sovereignty. In February of 1986, twelve members of the Community signed the "Single European Act" (SEA) and implemented it in 1987. The essence of the SEA in my considered opinion, is none other than to add the dimension of foreign policy to the already existing Community agreements. To this end, I am inclined to argue that it diplomatically evaded the subject of national sovereignty which according to Delors, threatens the very existence of the European community. The Preamble states: "The Preamble assumed that the European Communities resembled a

sovereign entity more than a mere collection of individual states..." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 43) (emphasis added)

In effect, the assumption was just an assumption, a false one at that. Andrew Moravcsik buttresses this view thus; "The SEA was the result of bargaining among the heads of government of the three most powerful EC countries: Britain, France and Germany; that these bargains represented the lowest common denominator; and that each leader jealously protected national sovereignty." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 21)

Prior to Jacques Delors speech at Bruges, Margaret Thatcher had given her famous speech at the same place one year before in September of 1988. She viewed the EC not as "the United States of Europe", but rather as "a family of European Nations", thus rejecting the concept of total integration.

Although the EC was the brainchild of 'far sighted men,' Thatcher had argued, Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 48)

As a ramification, Jacques Delors, Altiero Spinelli and others sought to provide the skeptics with an answer to the question of national sovereignty. The answer argues Delors, lies with federalism coupled with subsidiarity:

I often find myself invoking federalism as a method, with the addition of the principle of subsidiarity. I see it as a way of reconciling what for many appears to be irreconcilable; the emergence of a united Europe and loyalty to one's homeland; the need for a European power capable of tackling the problems of our age and the absolute necessity to preserve our roots in the shape of our nations and regions. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 52)

In essence argues Delors, this would provide a unified Europe under one political umbrella at a supranational level, and still maintain different national identities which have manifested themselves by invoking the principle of national sovereignty. The latter has no doubt become a problem for a United Europe. The principle of federalism referred to here is no different from the time honored American system.

The principle of subsidiarity on the other hand, varies from federalism according to Delors in that; nothing is entrusted to a bigger unit that can be best done by a smaller one. This is in effect a decentralized system.

In my mind therefore, I see no radical difference between it and federalism per se. After all, isn't federalism a decentralization of power where smaller units perform precisely those functions they do best? Again the classic example of the American system comes to my mind. It is my opinion therefore that, Delors and other proponents of subsidiarity, in effect have engaged in deliberate word-smithing to try and paint a different system from that of the Americas when in fact there is no difference.

The problem is that of sovereignty. In a federal setting, national sovereignty, the power to wheel and deal with other foreign nations *inter alia*, rests with the federal government and the units or states do not wield those powers. Consequently, they are not sovereign by themselves without the system.

If giving to states "what they do best" (subsidiarity!), also involves the negotiation of treaties, then they still wield political sovereignty and are recognized as such in international law! If on the other hand this means performing only, other less politically weighty social obligations like; the provision of health facilities, education structures, etc., then in my mind

federalism is synonymous to subsidiarity! It is no different from the saying that one cannot eat their cake and have it simultaneously, one has to make a choice.

This is no different from the European case. This in my view, is what haunts and will continue to haunt the European Union unless they decide to employ federalism as we know it, not a variation of the concept if political unity is their final goal. After all federalism in my view is but one concept; I know not of variations thereto but I am willing to learn.

On the 17th of February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty came into existence in effect reflecting Delors thinking on the principle especially with reference to the principle of subsidiarity thus; "respect for Europe's core values, increased accountability, and faithful application of the principle of the principle of subsidiarity will, according to the Treaty, preserve democracy and diversity within the new Europe." (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 65) (emphasis added)

The Treaty added to the Community, the aspect of a single currency, common foreign and security policies. In my view, the Treaty also very diplomatically evades the very thorny question regarding national sovereignty, which in my mind is accounted for by the use of the term - diversity - in the preamble. Could this then refer to diverse sovereign nations within the Union? My answer to this question is in the affirmative.





## **V. LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The European Union has had its successes primarily and specifically in the economic sphere. To deny this would be a display of sheer tenacious ignorance. From following the organization's history, it becomes clear to me that the European case does not differ from the economic integration that has been defined to lie on a continuum; where free trade exists on one hand and total economic integration lies on the other extreme end.

Indeed, the Union began by dismantling trade barriers among the members with the inception of the ECSC; this displays the characteristics of a customs union on the economic integration continuum. Today the members are still striving for a complete economic merger manifested by the Maastricht treaty which proposes the use of a common currency among other equally important aspects; this move endeavors to upgrade European integration to a common market, still on the same economic continuum.

In short, the Union has pursued a step by step functional approach to integration whose successes have been largely socio-economical and less so in the political arena, save for the "ability" to foster peace in Europe. The EDC which later evolved into WEU comes to mind, whose objective was to hold the Germans and later the Soviet Union in check; Ironically Germany's defeat in the second world war did not lay to rest, the very vivid and gory details of the Third Reich's dreams and escapades before and during the war. To this day, the German question has not been resolved by the European Union.

The defeat of the Soviet Union with the help of NATO, manifested by the collapse of communism is another successful milestone Europe can also take pride in. Both the

EDC/WEU and NATO go a long way to depict functional integration at its best, and indeed as I have argued before, the European nations' unrelenting reluctance to part with their political clout completely.

Hence the use of terms like "supranationality" and subsidiarity which in my view, are no different from federalism as we know it.

Ernst Haas had argued that:

Supranationality is not at the end of a continuum, whose other end is occupied by strict intergovernmentalism. Instead, supranationality refers to a process or style of decision making; a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreements by means of compromises upgrading common interests. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 245)

First of all the prefix -supra- before nationality, in my mind means above. If this argument holds, then intuitively, whatever happens at this level is clearly above any nation within the Union; this process to me invokes the concept of federalism. Again the classic American case comes to my mind. If then this argument is bought, Haas' contention about supranationality is obliterated.

Furthermore, supranationality and intergovernmentalism do lie on a continuum and at both extreme ends in my opinion. The evolution of the European Union to date emphasizes this argument. The fact that today, the Union's very existence is threatened by national sovereignty does no less so.

It is my opinion that these concepts are analogous to the phenomena of night and day, which lie on a continuum themselves. Yes, there is dawn and there is dusk. To me they are just stepping stones on the same continuum facilitating the smooth completion of the daily or

nightly metamorphosis between the two extremes. Even a cloudy day does not mean it is not day. Do they now negate the fact that indeed both extremes do exist? I think not.

It is for this reason that I hasten to add that, indeed Haas bypasses the essence of the phenomenon. What about the question of sovereignty? I would argue that not Haas' "supranationality" or Delors' subsidiarity, but classical federalism as we know it could be the answer to the Union's woes.

This could be possible if and only if the likes of Margaret Thatcher agree to the concept. Is it likely that they will? For one thing it is not impossible, although it has certainly proven to be the most difficult obstacle that the Union will face now and in the future.

What lessons can be drawn from this experience for Botswana? Clearly the EU's economic success is one thing to be admired if not emulated. Perhaps functional integration by phases within Southern Africa can follow the same route for the benefit of all members concerned. However, national sovereignty is the "Frankenstein" monster that is bound to impede integration and perhaps, threaten the very existence of any joint regional efforts. If it was not so, Europe would be totally integrated today.

Would federalism be the answer? In my mind the answer is twofold; yes and no. Yes because then complete integration can be attained on the same lines as the classic American example, leading perhaps to a "United States of Southern Africa." No because different nations are bound to argue no different from Margaret Thatcher, in effect emphasizing their individual national sovereignties.



## **VI. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION, ITS PLAYERS, AND ARGUMENTS FOR REGIONALISM**

Regional organizations have been defined on the basis of a variety of criteria, but most often on the premise of geographical proximity of members. However, others still have defied this sort of definition and fell under the umbrella of "functionalism" as a criteria as distinct from geography.

Consequently, while geography has been pivotal in such definitions of regional organizations, some organizations said to fall under the same category, have been commanding membership from countries across the globe.

Thus, according to Bennett, the U.S. for example, is a member of several organizations that claim regional status and that reach to almost every point of the compass, thus variously identifying the United States with the North Atlantic, American, and South East Asian areas, none of which conform to any natural geographic region. Hence,

the North Atlantic area opens to question whether an ocean represents a unifying factor or a barrier for determining a region; the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization throws further doubt on conformity to regional limits. The now defunct South East Asia Treaty Organization, was *for* the protection of South East Asian countries, but it was dominated *by* non-Asian states, which formed the majority of its membership. The membership of the Organization of American States includes all states in North, South and Central America, but geographers have never viewed both continents as a single well defined region. (Bennett, 1995, p.230).

For purposes of this research, regionalism should be construed to be an all encompassing term where both geographical proximity and "functionalism" are relevant

criteria. This notion is prompted by an array of factors; Tanzania is a founding member of the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) because of historical-political ties with the region, yet geographically speaking, Tanzania belongs more to Central Africa than to the South.

In August of 1994, Mauritius became the 12th member of SADC; yet even Mauritius is about 1200 miles East of Mozambique and not only separated from mainland Africa by a stretch of the Indian ocean, but, also by another whole country - The Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). See Figure 2 for the geography of the region.

If this is so then, it is also arguable that it is possible in the future to see Madagascar enter SADC as the 13th member. As a ramification, regionalism or regional integration should not only be limited to geographical contiguity of members but should also consider the functional aspect as another crucial foundation upon-which the organization will hinge.

Subsequently, it is the goals and objectives of SADC that will ultimately determine which country should be a player in the organization without undue emphasis on the question of geographical location of that country, albeit geography has hitherto been an important ingredient in "regional" endeavors. To this end, although regionalism in this case focusses on Southern Africa, it does not totally preclude countries without the Southern African regional context.

The following countries are current members of SADC listed in alphabetical order: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Also refer to Figure 2 for the Southern African Regional map below.



## **A. ARGUMENTS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION FROM BOTSWANA'S POINT OF VIEW**

### **1. The Geographical Location of Botswana**

Botswana is at the heart of Southern Africa, physically sandwiched by the other members of the region. This historical-geographical misfortune, somewhat dictated and still dictates that the country must inevitably rely on its neighbors for access to the outside world in terms of social, economic and political links.

To this end, historically, Botswana has had to perform a very precarious balanced juggling act of antagonism and accommodation vis-a-vis its racist neighbors least it generated perpetual economic and military punitive reactions.

This phenomenon was also a result of the country's weak and dependent economic posture. Chapter I sufficiently discusses Botswana's economic capabilities, or perhaps incapacities. To this end, out of necessity, the country has had to pursue certain "dictated" policies and positions regarding its neighbors particularly apartheid South Africa and Rhodesia, in the hope of realizing economic and other forms of development in the process.

Historically, other countries like Mozambique, have also played a significant role in providing Botswana with her much needed links with the outside world. However, because of destabilization tactics employed by Pretoria in Mozambique, these alternative options were not fully utilized, coupled with South Africa's economic and infrastructural strength within the region.<sup>30</sup> (Maandaza and Tostensen, 1994, p. 41)

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<sup>30</sup>For further readings on South Africa's destabilization activities in the region, refer to; Johnson P. and Martin D., Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986.



According to Mandaza and Tostensen, at the time of the 1980 SADC Lusaka Summit, South African ports handled 80 per cent of the external trade of six inland SADC states, with SADC ports handling the other 20 per cent. By 1982, with the opening of routes through Mozambique and Zimbabwe, an approximate 50:50 ratio was achieved. "However, this advance to a more economically rational system was quickly countered by South Africa's destabilization strategies."<sup>31</sup>

International traffic had briefly resumed on the Benguela railway in Angola in 1979, but was again swiftly disrupted by South Africa's backed UNITA forces.<sup>32</sup> Attacks by South African supported rebels on the Beira corridor were stepped up, until at the request of Mozambique, Zimbabwe stationed its own troops along this corridor in 1982.

The independence of the Republics of South Africa, Namibia, and perceived political stabilities and democracy in Mozambique and Angola, do not in themselves obliterate this position; Botswana will remain landlocked and subsequently dependent on her neighbors for her vital links with the outside world. To this end, South Africa has historically been the "provider" of such links for Botswana and to some extent for the entire region.

This phenomenon in my view, is unlikely to drastically change, although other vital links that were not in existence will now be explored or those that were deliberately crippled by Pretoria will now be fully utilized; for example, the "Trans-Kalahari" highway that cuts across the expanse of the desert in the west is provided for in the 7th NDP. This road will

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<sup>31</sup> Ibbo Mandaza and Arne Tostensen (ed. E.M. Maphanyane): Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future. From the Conference to a Community. SADC, 1994, p. 41.

<sup>32</sup>UNITA was a guerrilla movement opposing government in Angola and heavily reliant on South African assistance.

link Botswana directly with Namibia and the ports therein particularly, Walvis Bay. (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 7) Refer to the map of Botswana at Figure 3 below.

Although it is still arguable that South Africa's communication networks will continue to be dominant in the region, at least cooperation and alternative routes will be made available for Botswana. There is no question that the country will continue to be dependent on her neighbors for external links, and it is for this and other equally important reasons that compel the country to support regional integration.

## **2. The End of the Cold War and the Democratization of South Africa**

The collapse of the Soviet Union and with it, the cold war that ensued between the East and the West leading to political, ideological and other forms of antagonisms across the globe, heralds an opportunity for integration not only in Southern Africa but in the entire world as well.

Central to this argument at least in the Southern African context, is the fact that South Africa was supported and sustained by the West in their quest to destroy communism; that rationale has since ceased to exist when communism fell, and this has led to democracy in South Africa in effect, creating a very conducive environment for democratic integration in the region.

The use of the term democracy in this context implies the actual use of such a phenomenon in regional fora by democratic states, as opposed to the employment of elements of national power in pursuit of selfish national interests. Chapter I of this research addresses the role of democracy in regional integration efforts.




Figure 3. Map of Botswana.

To this end, South Africa's liberation movements had expressed their willingness to work together with the rest of the region to create a new pattern of regional relations along those lines. In a statement made on behalf of South African Liberation movements to the 1991 SADCC Annual Consultative Conference, ANC President, Nelson Mandela had said, "[A] liberated South Africa will come into SADCC on the basis of an agreed regional plan that would ensure balanced regional development and mutually beneficial cooperation among various countries."<sup>33</sup>

True to this commitment, after the historic shift toward democratic independence, South Africa was indeed welcomed into the organization as the eleventh member in August of 1994. The organization had since shifted from its original premise of isolationism in relation to South Africa to one of accommodation. The Declaration Treaty and Protocol that gave birth to a new SADC was signed in August of 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia by member states. South Africa ratified the instrument of accession to the same Treaty and Protocol on the 29th of August 1994; in effect echoing the very statement once made by President Mandela regarding equitable distribution of resources in the region.

Chapter 7, Article 21 (1) particularly provides for this mutual benefit of member countries: "Member states shall cooperate in all areas necessary to foster regional development and integration on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> SADC: *Regional Relations and Cooperation Post Apartheid*. Botswana Cooperative Union Printers, Gaborone, 1993, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup> SADC: Declaration Treaty and Protocol of Southern African Development Community; Gaborone Printing Works, Gaborone, 1995, p. 18.

### **3. Botswana's Inability to Unilaterally Achieve Her National Interests**

If history is anything to go by, it is quite manifest that Botswana is in no position to unilaterally and successfully achieve her national interests without external input. Firstly, the geographical misfortune of the country dictates that it should out of necessity, collude with its neighbors.

Secondly, Botswana is still a developing country in economic terms as seen already in Chapter I of this research. Historically, Botswana has had to rely heavily on external support for her economic survival; this argument is still pertinent today.

Subsequently, it is in fact in Botswana's interest to help foster regional integration in Southern Africa which is clarified further on reviewing the following aspects:

#### ***a. Mining and Agriculture***

Botswana's economy derives its strength from a number of inputs among which diamonds are in the fore front. The prospecting, investment capital to include roads, mining itself and the sale of these precious germs, was done and still is done with the help of the South African De Beers Mining Company in partnership with the government of Botswana. It is doubtful whether there will be any changes in the status quo, so that the current partnership will continue to obtain.

Other mining projects including prospecting will also continue with the aid of external private companies especially from South Africa. The current Soda Ash mining project at Sua Pan, about 400 kilo meters west of Francistown is one more example that is done with the help of private South African investors.

Although its importance has somewhat diminished, agriculture remains one of the important industries in Botswana, accounting for about 4 percent of the total GDP. To this end, its importance cannot be under estimated. Thus, "the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) countries signed the Lome Convention Agreements in 1975. These agreements removed the EEC ban on beef imports from ACP countries, but subjected them to the EEC's prohibitive variable import levy" (Thundberg, 1978, p. 45).

As a ramification, Botswana and other ACP beef exporters obtained a 90 per cent reduction on the levy for six months by mid 1975. After much protesting by late 1976, the quota was increased to 12 months. In the interim, Botswana strived very hard to diversify its markets within the Southern African region as well as the rest of the world. It is likely that this trend will continue, and closer to home, this may be greatly facilitated even more through a regional effort for sales within and without the region.

#### ***b. Communications***

Since independence, Botswana has been striving hard to create a communication infrastructure that would not only link the country with others in the region, but also with the rest of the world. Historically, the single rail road system running mostly on the eastern side of the country, originally built by the British to join the British Cape colony with Rhodesia, has been most instrumental in generating and sustaining Botswana's economy.

To this end, the development of industry along its length was encouraged and it stimulated the marketing of products of traditional industry at home and abroad. Today,

this rail track has branches at Serule linked to the copper mine in Selebe Phikwe, Palapye, adjoining the Morupule coal mine and at Francistown, joining the new soda ash mining project at Sua Pan.

These three branches principally cater for mining products while the main route caters for both the movement of goods and services and people. Although other modes of transportation have come into the picture, "the rail road still accounts for about three quarters of the tonnage of freight originating or terminating in Botswana" (Thundberg, 1978, p. 29). Also, "rail traffic fell over the period of 1986/87 to 1989/90. Reasons for the decline in freight traffic include the desire of SADCC member states to reduce dependence on South African ports, lower growth rates elsewhere in the region of competition from the Beit Bridge rail route." (NDP 7, 1991 - 1997, p. 198) Hence, with South Africa as a player in the region, it is arguable that the rail road will become one of the largest transport modes in Botswana.

Hence, "this single track system although small, carries a major share of the total traffic within the country, servicing both the internal transport needs and the export/import trade. Virtually all vital commodities, including coal, petroleum products, copper nickel matte, cattle and meat are transported on the railway." (NDP 5, 1979-85, p. 238) Refer to Figure 4 below depicting the Southern African railway system.

Subsequently, Botswana has access by rail to ports in Mozambique, Tanzania as well as South Africa. The construction and maintenance of houses, roads, industry among other endeavors, has taken off mostly although not wholly due to South African private investors. Murray and Roberts (a South African private company) for example, were



Figure 4. The Southern African Rail Network System.



instrumental in the construction of the "BOTZAM" road; the road linking Nata/Kazungula and Zambia and thus providing another alternative route for Botswana.

NDP 7 has also provided for a major road linking Botswana to Namibia across the Kalahari desert on the west, and thus opening up another alternative route to Namibian ports and markets that have not been exploited before. (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 7) It is arguable therefore that external input to the construction of such a road will be crucial both in terms of investment capital and qualified manpower for the project. See Figure 5 which depicts Botswana's national road network below.

*c. Tourism*

Among Botswana's other important sources of revenue is tourism; "it has been estimated that tourism may have accounted for as much as 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), in 1988/89, equivalent to about P125 million. This compares favorably with the shares of GDP attributed to agriculture and manufacturing, which amounted to about 3.0 per cent and 4.2 percent respectively, in 1988/89." (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 295)

Clearly, tourism is an important aspect of Botswana's economy. However, adverse political activities in neighboring countries had discouraged and even threatened the tourist industry. In particular, the proximity of Botswana's most developed national parks to the then volatile theaters of war in Zimbabwe and Namibia had severe adverse impact on the prospects for tourism.

However, problems in this area did not disappear with political stability in those neighboring countries to include South Africa; instead the problem has evolved into an




Figure 5. Botswana's National Roads Network.

illegal and even more problematic phenomenon to deal with - poaching of Botswana's wild life believed to be perpetuated by citizens of neighboring countries.

To this end, the Department of Wild life and National Parks has been assisted by the BDF in their anti-poaching campaigns. "The BDF also assisted the Department of Wild life and National Parks with anti-poaching activities." (NDP 7, 1991-97, p. 438) Nevertheless, however vigilant these BDF/Wild life Department anti-poaching campaigns are, as long as poachers are of external origin, countries of their origin need to be part and parcel of these campaigns in order to successfully stem out the problem.

Failure to ensure this may lead to the problem becoming a monotonous and cyclical problem which might become a bottomless pit into which resources will continuously be lost. The other negative spin off of this issue could be the fueling of inter-country hostilities; for example, in the process of performing their duties, responsible units may end up killing poachers (who are said to operate with automatic weapons and have been known to engage such units), and such fatal confrontations may lead to vehement protests from neighboring countries in defense of their "citizens."

This state of affairs would not auger well for any regional cooperation efforts. Thus, it becomes pertinent for Botswana and her neighbors to jointly review and resolve the problem.

#### *d. Security*

Another aspect that dictates external input is that of Botswana's internal security. During the height of the cold war, the most notable threat was profoundly external

in nature. With the advent of independence notably in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, such independence did not obliterate these threats.

Botswana like all sovereign polities is constantly under an external threat of some form or another albeit this threat has hitherto been minimized. However, disputes that cannot be amicably resolved may lead to inter-state confrontations. It is on this note that Botswana and her regional partners need to exercise restraint and refer all thorny matters to the negotiating table if confrontation is to be avoided. As a result, regional integration becomes a very important vehicle in this regard.

On the other side of the same coin, assuming that governments in the region dance to the same tune, the security threat on all the countries has evolved into an "intra-country" affair; armed robberies and violence inter alia have spared no member country within the region. Therefore be it AK 47 wielding poachers, bank robbers, car thieves and racketeers, the crux of the matter is that some regional concerted efforts are necessary to deal with the problems. These individuals perform their acts of aggression in one country and then flee into another to seek refuge from the law.

According to Ohlson and Stedman, "during the cease fire in Angola in 1992, weapons experts noted that the Angolan weapons were being sold in South Africa. A sizeable cross boarder trade in AK 47's has developed from Mozambique back to South Africa, fueling violence in Natal and the Vaal Triangle. Such developments show that conflict resolution cannot be based solely within nations, but must take into account the larger region as a whole." (Ohlson and Stedman, in *South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence*, 1993, p. 420) Currently Botswana has extradition treaties with South Africa

among others in the region, and this goes a long way in assisting in the curbing of violence in the country. It is also a member of some form of a "regional Interpol" where information on crime, criminals and such syndicates can be obtained when needed.

*e. Social Considerations*

On the social plane, people in Southern Africa belong to a large African family historians have referred to as the Bantu speaking people.<sup>35</sup> In this way, cooperation could be fostered on an understanding of similar origin. However, economic inequalities in the region could very well pose a serious threat to Botswana among others in the sub continent.

South Africa's economic hegemony continues to act as a beacon to various nationalities within the region. It is therefore arguable that the majority of the people in the region would like to migrate to South Africa where better socio-economic opportunities are available. It is also in the process of going to South Africa that some will inevitably find their way into Botswana should they fail to land in "paradise" they will be pursuing. Please refer to Figure 6 below, portraying recent migrations in Southern Africa.

The implications of these mass movements should not be under-emphasized; for one thing they may spark off hostilities in South Africa and else where toward employment seeking "foreigners" as a result of intensified competition for scarce opportunities. On the other equally important side of the same coin, they may result in serious "brain drain" from originating countries. SADC has already expressed fears in this regard and therefore, concerted regional efforts are imperative.

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<sup>35</sup> For more elaborate information on this aspect, please refer to Stevens, 1975, pp. 14-15.




Figure 6. Southern Africa Recent Migrations. (Source: South Africa and its neighbors. Rotberg, et. al.).

#### **4. Existing Structural Foundations for Integration**

There have been and still are historical platforms upon which integration can be facilitated in Southern Africa, albeit these fora have depicted a strong tilt toward economics in the region as opposed to other equally crucial aspects like security. These economic groupings are listed in the order of their establishment as follows; the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Common Monetary Area (CMA), the Southern African Development Conference (SADC) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA).

##### ***a. SACU***

SACU was "the first customs union in Southern Africa between the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State - was established in 1889, and by the mid 1890's all the countries of the present SACU except Namibia were in a customs union together."<sup>36</sup> Namibia's membership in SACU was formalized in 1990 when it attained its independence, although it was treated as part of the arrangement even when it was still administered by South Africa as South West Africa.

According to Maasdorp, SACU is the only economic integration arrangement in the sub continent. It provides for the duty free movement of goods and services among member countries and for a common external tariff against the rest of the world. It is therefore a customs and excise union since all custom duties and excise taxes are part of the common revenue pool administered by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB).

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<sup>36</sup>Gavin Maasdorp. Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Prospects for Regional Integration. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992, p. 5.

Revenue is shared among member countries according to a formula which includes a raising factor of 42 percent to compensate Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia commonly referred to as the BLSN countries. This measure is some form of compensation for the BLSN countries for being in partnership with a more economically developed and industrialized partner - South Africa.

The amounts thus calculated are then adjusted by a stabilization factor so as to ensure a reasonably consistent rate of revenue for BLSN. Thus, "in terms of the Agreement, any BLSN country may protect new industries by levying additional duties on imports for a maximum of eight years; specify industries which are likely to be of importance to its economy as well as the period over which these industries should receive tariff assistance and relief; and prohibit the importation of goods for "economic, social, cultural and other reasons." (Maasdorp, 1992, p. 5)

It is manifest then that Botswana and other countries in the region could utilize this forum to facilitate integration in the region.

***b. CMA***

The BLS countries have utilized the South African currency from the beginning of the monetization of their economies in the second half of the 19th century, and Namibia did so after its occupation in the first world war. According to Maasdorp however, the first formal monetary agreement was signed in 1974 between South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) while Botswana elected not to join.

To this end, the BLS countries could use their own currencies for internal use and the South African Rand was to be used for foreign exchange transactions and was to be



legal tender throughout the entire area. The RMA provided for uninhibited inter country fiscal movements to include; compensation for loss of interest these members would have earned on external reserves, access to South African money and capital markets etc.

Hence, each country was responsible for its own internal fiscal controls while South Africa was solely responsible for the management of the rand currency and gold and foreign exchange reserves of the RMA. By 1986, Swaziland among others in the region had successfully lobbied for a change in the set up which gave birth to Tri-lateral Monetary Agreement (TMA) leading to the CMA.

The CMA provided for the following; Swaziland and Lesotho could issue their own currencies but the rand could no longer be legal tender in Swaziland (although in practice, it is quite widely used). In Lesotho, the rand and *Maloti* (Lesotho's currency) would both be legal tender there. Although both countries are free to authorize foreign exchange payments in their countries and have agreed to apply similar controls to those of the SARB, they have not exercised this right due to the practical advantages of having parity with the rand.

On the other hand, Botswana introduced her own currency - the Pula in 1975 and thus practically withdrawing from the RMA to enable her to pursue independent exchange rates and monetary policies. This was a result of the fact that, South Africa as a dominant partner in the RMA influenced the policies of the entire region by its own internal economic actions. Namibia introduced her own new currency in July of 1993, it is also arguable however, that the rand may continue to be widely used therein.

The CMA with its current three members, LSN, the past association with it by Botswana, together with the membership of South Africa in SADC, and "the evident need for some harmonization of monetary and exchange rate policy as a key pillar of an integration program has led to suggestions that the CMA should be enlarged and the rand become a regional currency. The CMA could serve as a nucleus of regional monetary and financial integration upon which to build the whole community's monetary and financial arrangements." (SADC, 1993, p. 80)

However, democratic inter country fiscal dealings leading to mutually equitable benefits could be the only paramount reason behind the acceptance of this thinking.

*c. SADC*

"The first SADC meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1979, aimed at harmonizing development plans and reducing the regions economic dependence on South Africa, resulting in nine (9) member countries from Southern Africa signing a treaty." (SADC: Theme Document, 1992)

Clearly, the rationale for SADC was to lessen the other regional members' dependence on South Africa, and possibly as a measure to politically ostracize the republic. With a democratic South Africa and a member of the same organization, SADC's original motive has ceased to exist. Consequently, the organization has had to make a revised outlook especially in relation to South Africa.

Thus, the latter was heartily accepted into the "new" organization after she signed the instrument of accession on the 29th of August in 1994. In effect, ratifying the new

SADC Treaty and Protocol which resulted from the Windhoek summit of August 1992, that gave SADC its new accommodative in the stead of its original isolationist complexion.

SADC operates on the basis of the following institutions established by Chapter 5, Articles 9 through 16 of its Treaty and Protocol:

(1) The Summit. The Summit consists of heads of State or governments of member countries and are the supreme policy making, directing and controlling organ of SADC. Their decision is reached by consensus and is legally binding on members. Thus, the Summit meets annually and is the supreme political organ behind the existence and sustenance of SADC.

However, these political representatives are elected by their own citizens in their own countries and it is arguable therefore that their political allegiance first and foremost rests with their respective countries as opposed to SADC.

(2) The Council. The Council consists of ministers from member countries preferably those responsible for economic planning or finance. They meet annually and basically oversee execution of policies and objectives set down by the Summit. They are also capable of generating policies themselves in line with the provisions of the Treaty and act as advisors to the Summit. Decisions of the Council are also reached by consensus. Council members are also politicians in their own right in their respective countries.

(3) The Commissions. These are permanent and or ad hoc bodies created for specific projects and have to be approved by the Summit through an appropriate protocol. They are responsible to and report to the Council.

(4) The Standing Committee of Officials. This is a technical advisory committee for the Council and reports to it. It also meets annually and its decisions are also reached by a consensus. Its membership consists of permanent secretaries or government officials of equivalent rank from member states, preferably one from the ministry responsible for economic planning or finance.

(5) The Secretariat. This is the principal executive institution of SADC and is headed by an Executive Secretary who is responsible for:

1. Strategic planning and management of the programs of SADC.
2. Implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council
3. Organization and management of SADC meetings.
4. Financial and general administration.
5. Representation and promotion of SADC.
6. Coordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies of member states.

(6) The Executive Secretary. This is the main institution within SADC that is responsible for the daily successful operations of the organization, and is appointed for a four year term renewable for another period not exceeding four years.

(7) The Tribunal. The tribunal is an ad hoc body incepted when there is a need for adjudication on dispute arising out of misinterpretation of the provisions of the Treaty, or need for advisory legal opinions by the Summit and the council. Its decisions are final and binding. Consequently, the Tribunal is to SADC what the International Court of Justice is to the United Nations.

However, interpretation of the law is a very fluid undertaking such that, no two bodies can interpret the same thing in precisely the same way. Consequently, it has been argued that even though decisions of such bodies are binding, there could still be room for further varying interpretation.

So far, it has been manifest that SADC is a body that fosters cooperation from an economical premise. In my considered opinion, SADC has thus far continued to maintain its original outlook except that it has also welcomed South Africa to its ranks. To this end, other equally important aspect like security are not addressed by the organization.

As a ramification, the 1995 SADC Consultative Conference held in Lilongwe, Malawi, "welcomed the creation of the new sector on Politics, Democracy, Peace and Security. SADC's international partners do support and welcome such a move, and they subsequently urged SADC to work out the modalities, structures and mandates for the sector." (SADC: Resources, Institutions and capacity for Integration, 1995, p. 178)

*d. The PTA*

The PTA by nature is in conflict with SADC; the latter permits counter trade, protectionism etc., while the former aims to increase trade in a larger region than SADC by decreasing tariffs and other trade barriers. See Figure 7 below for the PTA membership as at 1984. Consequently, both organizations can be harmonized to pursue objectives that positively impact the region.



## **5. Free Market Economic Globalism**

The end of the cold war has led to a possibility of the internationalization of democracy and with it a free economic market system. In this way, Kenichi Ohmae argues that consumerism will be a crucial factor in the world stage especially as depicted in the United States of America.

Thus, "large numbers of people from more points on the globe than ever before have aggressively come forward to participate in history. They have left behind centuries, even millennia, of obscurity in forest and desert and rural isolation to request from the world community - and from the global economy that links it together - a decent life for themselves and a better life for their children. A generation ago, even a decade ago, most of them were as voiceless and invisible as they always have been. This is true no longer: they have entered history with a vengeance, and they have demands - economic demands - to make." (Ohmae, 1995, p. 1)

As a ramification, these concerted demands on governments within given political boundaries, will be too overbearing that the need for economics to transcend political boundaries if those demands are not met (which they won't) is inevitable. To this end, especially today in the latter part of the 20th century, economics has especially demonstrated to know no geographical boundaries as a result of what Ohmae refers to as the four I's. These are: investment, industry, information and technology and individual consumers. To this end, regional integration especially manifested through SADC becomes the vehicle through which these factors can be achieved.

## **B. INVESTMENT**

Without a doubt, investment is and has always been driven by profit which is in turn tied to the availability of a market within any given area or region. If there are high possibilities for a profitable venture anywhere around the globe, investment (international), follows and Ohmae argues that it is for the most part "private." Thus, government participation and the subsequent controls associated with it are reduced if not done away with. Hence, "money will go where good opportunities are." (Ohmae, 1995, p. 3)

## **C. INDUSTRY**

Industry is similar to investment in its global outlook. As corporations move across the globe looking for greener pastures, they bring with them working capital. From the latter, technological and managerial know-how is transferred to the host country. It is not so because the host state has struck certain economic deals with the investors but rather because, in order to survive in this economically competitive world stage, it becomes imperative that they do so or ignore to do so at their own peril.

As a result, these "economic migrations" are shaped and governed not by reasons of state but by the desire and the need to serve attractive markets wherever they exist. Consequently, "the western firms now moving, say, into parts of China and India are there because that is where their future lies, not because the host government has suddenly dangled a carrot in front of their nose." (Ohmae, 1995, p. 3)

## **D. INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY AND INDIVIDUAL CONSUMERS**

Information and technology has also driven individual consumerism on a global scale. With better access to information about lifestyles around the globe, consumers have been



placed in a position where they make their own choices; they want the best and the cheapest products regardless of their origin, and according to Ohmae, they have shown their willingness to vote these preferences with their pocket books.

Consequently, "global brands of blue jeans, colas and stylish athletic shoes are as much on the mind of the taxi driver in Shanghai as they are in the kitchen or the closet of the school teacher in Stockholm or Sao Paulo" (Ohmae, 1995, p. 29). Thus, as the quality, range and availability of information improves, so does the awareness of people regarding their needs and economic choices irrespective of their geographical location.

Having said that then, it becomes manifest that regional integration becomes the only viable means to prevent the region from being completely swallowed up by international economic competitors with better technology and resource capabilities.



## VII. CONCLUSION

Given the past hardships that Botswana found herself in as a result of all the historical factors discussed in Chapter I, it seems arguable that the country will pursue more or less the same approach in pursuit of its national interests.

However, because of changes in the world political climate, especially in the context of the Southern African region, integration seems to be the most potent of all avenues. A whole array of arguments for this phenomenon have been advanced, among which are the following:

1. There is a natural tendency toward regionalism based on the homogeneity of interests, traditions, and values within small groups of neighboring states.
2. Political, economic, and social integration is more easily attained among a lesser number of states within a limited geographical area than on a global basis.
3. Regional economic cooperation provides more efficient economic units than the smaller states, and these larger units can compete successfully in the world markets.
4. Local threats to the peace are more willingly and promptly dealt with by the governments of that area than disinterested states at greater distances. (Bennett, 1995, pp. 230-231)

These regional organizations have been categorized into groups depending on the nature or scope of their functions, or memberships, or the eventual degree of integration sought. According to Bennett, these groups are; multi-purpose, alliance, functional or U.N. regional organizations. (Bennett, 1995, p. 236)

For purposes of this research, focus will be on the first three categories. Thus, "the multi-purpose organizations are those whose broad aims and activities reach across the lines that divide political and military matters from those generally classified as economic and social. Alliance-type organizations are those whose military and political orientation is intended to provide security against external actors. Functional organizations are those that promote economic, social, or political collaboration, with little or no regard to security factors." (Bennett, 1995, p. 236)

From the above definitions, it is clear that all the regional endeavors thus far attempted in the region, generally tend to fall under functionalism. To this end, SADC itself has expressed this outlook with a view perhaps to evolving into a multi-purpose organization; the 1995 SADC Consultative Conference held in Lilongwe, Malawi expressed a need for a new sector within SADC for politics, democracy, peace and security. In this way then, SADC may well become a "supra- national body" within the region. The "classic" example of the European Union comes to mind.

It is instructive to note however that, although arguments for regional integration are very convincing, integrating countries often run into or generate a quagmire of problems for the organization which threatens its very existence; "the emergence of a host of new independent states, seeking separate identities, jealous of their sovereign prerogatives, and determined to seek the promotion of their national interests, not through an onslaught on the state system but within its framework." (Bennett, 1995, p. 263)

Thus, even the classic European Union has not escaped this political pit fall, so that the question that still remains is whether the organization is indeed supra-national or simply,

a collaboration of sovereign states. Different European scholars have come up with varying labels to try and provide an answer to this haunting question. Jacques Delors - the french diplomat, has advocated subsidiarity as the answer, Margaret Thatcher on the other hand, has vehemently argued that a collaboration of sovereign European states is the way to go as opposed to ceding all political power to a regional organization. Consequently, emphasizing on national sovereignty.

These arguments in my mind fall on a spectrum; with emphasis on sovereign states on one end and supra-nationalism on the other end, which to me is no different from federalism as we know it, (if individual sovereign states were to completely cede their sovereignty to a representative supra-national body). In this way, it can then be argued that in fact, political members of such a body will have to be responsible and answerable to such a body and not their respective places of origin. Consequently, they might also have to be elected at that level so that their allegiance would be unshakable.

This is a crucial and problematic issue for many organizations which will continue to be the bone of contention among integrating states. Perhaps historically speaking, all states both young and old, are not yet ready for such regional endeavors and therefore, they should pursue a functional approach even in multi-purpose organizations.

The other problem is that of selfishness on the part of powerful countries. For example, "the OAS, as a multi-purpose organization, has also been perverted, through military and political intervention, into an instrument of the United States foreign policy within the hemisphere. It has provided a cloak of legitimacy for unilateral United States action." (Bennett, 1995, p. 263)

The remedy to this problem in my view is the adherence to principle of democracy as espoused in Chapter I of this research. In this way, it is hoped that with South Africa's full cooperation, a strong regional organization may be made. Thus far, South Africa has been agreeable in this regard. It is therefore manifest that, the Southern African countries must tow the line toward regionalism for them to be competitive on the world stage, and also satisfy their citizens demands at home, or neglect this aspect at their own peril.

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